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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). On November 1, 1989, a judgment (R. 117-119; 
Addendum A hereto) was entered in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The 
plaintiff appealed from the order entered November 1, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the district court apply the correct interpretation 
of the motor club surety bond and the related statutes in deter-
mining that there is no liability imposed upon the insurer? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
The determinative statutes and cases believed by 
respondent to support respondent's arguments are: 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-11-102 (1989 Supp.); 
Utah Code Ann. §41-16-1(1), 1953. 
Cases 
Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 560 
(Utah 1983); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-1108 (Utah 
1982); Western Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237 (Utah App. 
1988); City of Wichita v. Home Cab Co., 101 P.2d 219 (Kan. 1940). 
Other Authorities 
Couch On Insurance 2d, §1587 (1984) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings 
and Disposition in the Court Below 
The defendant agrees with the plaintiff's description of 
the nature of the case, the court's proceedings and the 
disposition of the court below. 
Statement of Facts 
The defendant agrees with the plaintiff's statement of 
facts as stated in the plaintiff's brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Inasmuch as the motor club bond issued by the defendant 
has been given in compliance with the statutes governing motor 
clubs, the scope of the statute and the bond must be read in such 
a manner so as to relate to the purpose and the subject discussed 
by legislature in creating the statutes governing motor clubs. 
The statutes address motor clubs and the offer of motor club 
services and not the liability of motor clubs or its principals in 
general. The reasonable interpretation of the statute and the 
bond, and the liabilities imposed do not include the sale of capi-
tal notes. If such an interpretation were adhered to, the motor 
club bond would be transformed in nature to a liability policy for 
the principals that would include coverage for activities far 
beyond the scope of usual motor club activities. 
Despite the rule that a surety bond is to be construed 
against the surety and in favor of those who are insured, even 
under such strict construction, the actions of the principals of 
American Drivers Legal Services in issuing and selling capital 
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notes did not constitute any type of motor club services and thus 
there is no liability under the bond and no duty on the part of 
defendant to make payment. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NO DUTY TO MAKE PAYMENT UNDER 
THE BOND AS THE PRINCIPALS FROM AMERICAN 
DRIVERS LEGAL SERVICES FAITHFULLY FURNISHED 
AND RENDERED MOTOR CLUB SERVICES-
The issue before this Court in determining whether or not 
the lower court correctly interpreted the subject bond centers on 
whether the issuing and selling of capital notes by the principals 
of American Drivers Legal Services can be construed as part of the 
motor club's services. 
The plaintiff has asserted in its brief that inasmuch as 
the bond language is allegedly broader than the statutory language, 
the bond should be construed against the surety to include cover-
age for the issue and sale of capital notes. Plaintiff is criti-
cal of the defendant's bond language suggesting that the bond 
language could have easily limited coverage to the "selling or 
rendering motor club services" rather than the current bond lan-
guage of the "selling or rendering any of Principal's services." 
Plaintiff, however, has failed to provide a reasonable 
interpretation of both the bond and the statutes governing the 
bond. Plaintiff has failed to establish that the issue and sale 
of capital notes is part of motor club services and that the 
intent of the legislature in requiring a motor club bond included 
coverage for anything other than motor club services. 
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Motor Club's Services Defined 
Former Utah Code Ann. §41-16-1(1) defined motor club 
services as follows: 
Motor club service shall consist of rendering, 
furnishing or procuring insurance service, 
towing service, emergency road service, license 
service, theft service, claims adjustment service, 
bail bond service, discount service, map service, 
towing service, legal service on a reimbursement 
basis, or any one or more of such services to 
persons in connection with ownership, operation, 
use or maintenance of a motor vehicle by a person 
in consideration of such person being or becoming 
a member of an association or club rendering, 
procuring or furnishing such service, or being 
or becoming entitled to receive membership or 
other motor club services therefrom. 
The current statute defining motor club services was 
effective for at least a period of time in which American Drivers 
Legal Services, Inc. offered and sold capital notes. The current 
statute provides as follows: 
(1) Motor clubs authorized under this chapter 
may provide or arrange for the following 
services: 
(a) service as agent or broker in 
obtaining insurance coverage from 
authorized insurers, subject to 
Chapter 23; 
(b) provision of, or payment for, legal 
services and costs in the defense 
of traffic offenses or other legal 
problems connected with the ownership 
or use of a motor vehicle, provided 
the maximum amount payable for any 
one incident is not more than 100 
times the annual charge for the motor 
club contract; 
(c) guaranteed arrest bond certificates 
and cash bond guarantees as specified 
under §31A-11-112; 
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(d) payment of specified expenses resulting 
from an automobile accident, other than 
expenses for personal injury or for 
damage to an automobile, provided the 
maximum amount payable for any one 
accident is not more than 100 times the 
annual charge for the motor club con-
tract; 
(e) towing and emergency road services and 
theft services; and 
(f) any services relating to travel not 
involving the transfer and distribution 
of risk. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-11-102 (1989 Supp.). 
The issuing and selling of capital notes '-ap in. no way be 
included as part of motor club services i:rvi-vr * b.& vr^adest 
interpretation of motor club services under both the former stat-
ute and the current statute. Additionally, the language of the 
bond does not broaden i n ai i> A/a,;y 11 1 e :iefinition of motc: • i : c 1 i ib 
services. 
The purpose in requiring a motor club bond is to protect 
members of motor clubs by insur i.ng 11: lat 11: le i i 101oi: ::J i ib se i: < ;r ic es 
they contract for will be made available. The bond is required by 
law to protect parties from injury by reason of misrepresentation 
or failure on the part of the principals in renie- :=M motor club 
services. 
Plaintiff 1s Unreasonable Interpretation 
The plaintiff's argument that the offer and sale of capi-
tal notes binds the defendant to make payment under the bond 
because the parties were defrauded by the wrongful acts of the 
principals of American Drivers Legal Services irl "failing or 
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rendering any of the principal services" is an unreasonable 
interpretation of both the bond and the statutes governing motor 
clubs. 
The defendant recognizes that this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have adopted the rule that a surety bond issued by a 
surety who makes insurance a business for compensation is 
construed against the surety in favor of those who are insured. 
Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557, 560 
(Utah 1983). However, both the Supreme Court and this Court have 
recognized limitations to that rule. Prior to interpreting a 
motor vehicle bond in Western Surety Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237 
(Utah App. 1988), this Court gave the following guidance: 
The primary rule in interpreting the contract 
.is to determine what the party has intended 
by looking at the entire contract and all of 
its parts in relation to each other, giving an 
objective and reasonable construction to the 
contract as a whole. 
Id. at 1240 (quoting Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-1108 
(Utah 1982). Thus the duty of the court in interpreting the motor 
club bond and the statutes governing the bond is to look at the 
entire contract and to give an objective and reasonable construc-
tion to the contract as a whole. Couch On Insurance summarized 
the general rule with respect to the construction of an insurance 
contract in accord with intent. 
A fair and lawful interpretation is required 
even where the doubts are to be resolved in 
favor of an insured. The rule of favorable 
construction for the insured should not be 
applied so as to let down the bars established 
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by the standards here and before considered, 
and permit a construction which is unreasonable 
and not in keeping with the language used and 
the obvious intent of the parties. The 
restriction of the rule to ambiguities nega-
tives any concept of the license to apply the 
rule without the restraint imposed by the 
principal that the purpose of construction is 
to determine the meaning of the contract 
according to the clear language thereof. Thus, 
in construing the language of a contractor's 
bond, effect must be given to the intention 
of the parties, if that intention can be found 
from the language employed, notwithstanding 
less ambiguous language might have been 
employed. In no event should the language of 
the policy be ignored, twisted or distorted. 
The better statement of the rule itself 
indicates that it is only where one possible 
reasonable construction is balancing against 
another that the rule applies. 
Couch On Insurance 2d, §1587 (1984). 
Defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to pre-
sent a reasonable interpretation and construction of tt le bon,' 1 as a 
whole. Thus, the rule that the ambiguities of a contract are io 
be constr ueel against 11 Ie i nsi irer shouJ d r Iot be uti 1 i zed because 
the plaintiff has failed to put forth a reasonable interpretation. 
Additionally, plaintiff alleges that clear language could have 
beei Llized by the defendatit. If the language used is in keep-
ing with the intent of the parties and the purpose of the statute, 
then the language used must be considered to be acceptable. 
In City of Wichjta v. Home Cab Co., 101 P.2d 219 (Kan. 
1940), the Kansas Appellate Court discussed the rules and 
interpretation with respect to a surety bond. 
In Home Cab Co. , a supersedeas sut: ety bond was i ssued to 
the Home Cab Company principal, and Mary Hoffman, surety, in order 
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to perfect an appeal of a Kansas Supreme Court decision to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Following the dismissal of 
the appeal by the Supreme Court of United States, a dispute arose 
as to what damages the surety was liable for under the subject 
bond. 
In addressing the issue, the Kansas Supreme Court noted 
the general rule in construction of surety bonds: 
In 8 Am.Jur. 722, Bonds, §37, the rule stated 
as follows: "In construing an instrument under 
seal, although the courts generally adhere 
closely to the letter, the prevailing rule 
allows a court to place itself in the position 
of the contracting parties and to consider, 
in view of all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding execution on the instrument, what 
the parties intended. In the event the 
intention of the parties is manifest, such 
intent must control in the interpretation of 
the instrument, regardless of the inapt 
expressions or mere technical rules of 
construction . . . . 
The subject motor club bond in the instant case was never 
intended to indemnify members who had claims unrelated to motor 
club services. Clearly, none of the victims of the fraud 
perpetrated by the principals of American Drivers Legal Services 
could have reasonably expected that the subject bond would cover 
the unauthorized issuance of security notes. Likewise, the State 
of Utah in requiring the motor club bond did not intend that the 
issuance and sale of capital notes would be covered under the 
bond. It intended to cover those services defined as motor club 
services in the statute. 
The plaintiff's reliance on the Utah Supreme Court deci-
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sion of Dennis Dillon Qldsmobile, 668 P.2d 557, is misplaced. 
In Dillon, the language 
were much broader than the language •„ r the defendant'-: •'-.*:.• >r <;Lub 
bond. In Dillon, both motor vehicle bonds bound the insurers "to 
indemnify any and all persons, firms and corpiM.ai r::i^  for any loss 
suffered . in the penal sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars." Id. 
at 561 (emphasis added). The court noted: "By the literal lan-
guage of the bonds, t!le sureties rendered themselves 1iable up to 
a maximum of $20,000 for any loss suffered by any and all 
persons." Id. 
In the current case, the motor club bond does not provide 
indemnity for any loss. It provides coverage for losses resulting 
from "misrepresentation or failure on the part of principal in 
selling or rendering any of principal's services . ^? ^he sum 
of Twenty-Five Thousand . . Dollars." (Emphasis added) 
The principals wei: e :i i: I business as a motor: c 1 \ it ai id the 
bond was intended to cover injuries and damages resulting from 
the failure to render motor club services. 
The obligation of American tv i .:'i * ,:e:/ * .' * -. J ir :e 
Company as expressed in the clear language of the bond is trig-
gered upon the occurrence of one or more of the following acts by 
the principals of the motor club: 
1. Failure to fully and faithfully comply with Utah Code 
Ann. §41-16-2 and its successor statutes; 
2 . Fai 1 ui:e t< :) £ aj thfully furnish ai I< i rendei to i ts i i tem-
bers any and all motor club services sold or offered by it; and 
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3, Failure to pay any fines, fees or penalties imposed 
under Utah Code Ann. §41-16-2 and its successor statutes. 
Under the facts of the case, as stipulated by the 
parties, there have been no acts that fall into any of the preced-
ing categories, and thus, the obligation to pay has not been trig-
gered by any action of the principals of American Drivers Legal 
Services Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff asserts that coverage under the bond is not 
limited to motor club services but includes any services under-
taken by the principals, including the opportunities to invest in 
unauthorized securities. Plaintiff's interpretation fails to 
recognize any limitations of coverage, so long as the principals 
of the motor club are offering the services, despite how unrelated 
such services may be to those normally associated with motor clubs. 
The defendant recognizes the rule of construction of a 
surety bond issued by a surety for hire requires the bond be 
construed against the defendant surety and in favoring the insurer. 
However, such rule has limits and the construction or 
interpretation of the bond that is construed against the surety 
must maintain reasonableness and the Court cannot permit a con-
struction which is unreasonable and not in keeping with the lan-
guage used in the bond and which is not compatible to the statutes 
governing the bond. 
The sale of capital notes cannot be construed as being 
part of motor club's services as those services are defined by 
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statute. The bond is required by law to protect parties from 
injury by reason of misrepresentation or failure on the part of 
the principals in rendering motor club services. Any interpreta-
tion beyond that is unreasonable. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests 
that this court affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgment 
to defendant and affirm its order declaring that there is no cov-
erage provided under the bond for the offer and sale of capital 
notes by American Drivers Legal Services Inc. to its members and 
others based upon the false statements regarding the nature and 
quality of the capital notes and that defendant has no liability 
to plaintiff. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 1990. 
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DAVID J. OLSEN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. C87 7330 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
The motion of defendant American Manufacturers Mutual 
Insurance Company for summary judgment and plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, on September 25, 1989. Plaintiff, State of Utah, was 
represented by Neal T. Gooch, Assistant Attorney General. 
Defendant and third-party plaintiff, American Manufacturers 
Mutual was represented by Joseph J. Joyce, of the law firm of 
Strong & Hanni. Third-party defendant, David J. Olsen, was 
represented by Mark R. Gaylord of the law firm of Hansen & 
Anderson. After hearing arguments of counsel, and considering 
the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties and being 
otherwise fully advised, the Court determines: 
1. There are no genuine issues of material fact 
pursuant to the stipulation of facts executed by the parties. 
2. Under a reasonable interpretation of the subject 
statutes and subject bond, the Court finds that there is no 
liability imposed upon insurer. The Court finds that the bond 
does not include the sale of capital notes by the principals of 
American Drivers Legal Services. 
3. The terms and conditions of the bond are not 
ambiguous. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The motion of defendant American Manufacturers 
Mutual Insurance Company for summary judgment is hereby granted 
and judgment is hereby entered in favor of American Manufacturers 
Mutual Insurance Company against plaintiff, no cause of action. 
2. Plaintifffs motion for partial summary judgment is 
hereby denied. 
2 
3, The court determines that there is no just reason 
for delay in entering this judgment as a final judgment, and the 
clerk of the court is so directed to enter it as a final judgment 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
DATED this / day of / ^/^xA^jjiu^y , 1989, 
ambthy R. Hanson 
)istrict Court Judge 
ATTEST 
By 
?st*e£^^//£??^^ 
DepLt; Cc.k 
r* *> 
